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assumes that under a declared state of emergency, the individual going out suffers psychological
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derived that under a declared state of emergency, going out entails a strong psychological cost,
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1 Introduction
The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) has become a global pandemic that has infected more
than 12 million people worldwide (WHO, 2020). To reduce the spread of this disease, countries
around the world have adopted a variety of policies. In particular, as a strong measure to reduce
infection, policies have been implemented to restrict people’s activities, especially their ability to
go out so as to decrease their chances of contact. Other policies have also been applied globally
to protect people, such as social distancing, stay home, school closure, and protection measures
at ports and airports. Yoo and Managi (2020) argue that such policies against COVID-19 will
save lives and consequently minimize economic losses. Furthermore, Nakamura and Managi (2020)
show that reducing air travel decreases the risk of the import and export of goods. Policies that
restrict behavior with the aim to prevent the spread of infectious diseases can be categorized into
two types: enforceable behavioral restrictions that consider penalties using the legal system, and
behavioral restrictions that do not use the legal system and are left to people’s sense of self-restraint
(unenforceable).
An example of the former is the behavioral limitation imposed by the policies of several European
countries where the COVID-19 infection had spread rapidly. France imposes fines of between 135
and 3,700 Euros if going out for purposes other than those authorized by the government, such
as the purchase of daily necessities, under the Health Emergency Bill approved by lawmakers on
March 22, 2020. In Italy, which has the world’s fourth highest number of COVID-19-related deaths
at 34,938 (as of July 10, 2020), a decree ordered a nationwide curfew on March 10, 2020, with fines
of up to 3,000 Euros for those who do not carry a “certificate” stating where they are going and
why. Moreover, as of July 10, 2020, the United States has the highest number of cases in the world.
New York State, with the highest number of cases in the country, issued a governor’s decree on
March 22, 2020, requiring 100% telecommuting. The decree imposes fines of up to 10,000 dollars if
a company fails to comply and causes serious physical harm to its employees.
In contrast with these strict measures against the spread of infectious diseases that prohibit
citizens from going out and impose severe private rights restrictions by the state with penalties
for violations, several countries have a vague legal basis for restricting behavior. This refers to the
second type of policy described above—a policy of curtailment based on people’s decision-making,
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without enforcement. Sweden, which aims to get a certain number of people infected and immunized
without strict restrictive measures, recommends working from home and only advocates avoiding
unnecessary travel and social contact with high-risk older people. Japan, which has the lowest
number of cases per million people among the 36 industrialized countries in the OECD, has a non-
coercive, unenforceable policy with a vague legal basis, such as declaring a state of emergency and
requesting that people refrain from leaving home unnecessarily to control the spread of COVID-19.
Thus, in Japan, the amount of going-out behavior actually decreased after the declaration of
the state of emergency (The Japan Times, 2020a; Kyodo News, 2020). As a result, the number of
infected people is considered to have been controlled more successfully compared with that in other
OECD countries (Lu et al., 2020; Iwasaki and Grubaugh, 2020). However, although these reports
of reduced going-out behavior compare such behavior before and after the emergency declaration,
they only focus on the situation in densely populated central metropolitan areas and do not control
for public awareness of the increase in the number of people infected and the behavior reflected by
it. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude from these reports whether the declaration of emergency
actually reduced the amount of going-out behavior across the country, that is, the entire area within
which the request for self-restraint was made.
In fact, the effect of these requests for self-restraint on the consciousness in Japan can be seen in
one phenomenon, the “self-restraint police” (Jishuku Keisatsu in Japanese). The self-restraint police
are said to be members of the general public who conduct private policing of individuals and groups
who do not comply with requests to refrain from going out or other activities under the emergency
declaration. There have been incidents involving these self-restraint police, such as harassing phone
calls, posts about restaurants that were operating under the declared state of emergency (The Japan
Times, 2020c), slander of travelers because of their history of having COVID-19 (The Japan Times,
2020b), and damage to travelers’ cars at tourist sites when the license plate numbers indicated that
the cars were from another prefecture (The Japan Times, 2020b).
This phenomenon likely occurred because people have an aversion to those who do not refrain
from going out, even in the case of non-legally binding declarations of a state of emergency. Thus,
we suggest that even under unenforceable policies, people may refrain from going out with the goal
of avoiding the social stigma of going out. Accordingly, this study focuses on people’s restrictions
from going out under such a decree that has an ambiguous legal basis, from both the theoretical
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and empirical perspectives.
Specifically, for the theoretical analysis, we introduce a theoretical model that analyzes self-
restraint behavior in the context of spreading infectious diseases from the perspective of stigma.
First, statements such as the Japanese government’s state of emergency are not legally binding.
Thus, there are no fines or penalties for individuals who go out. Nevertheless, most Japanese
citizens refrained from going outside under the state of emergency. A plausible reason why the
declaration was successful is that most people were afraid of the risk of infection at that time. For
example, Aum et al. (2020) assume that people accept the disutility of going out due to the risk of
infection and conclude that people will stay home if they are at high risk of infection. If this is the
only reason, then the effect of restraint should be consistent when the risk of infection is constant
under the state of emergency and after it is lifted. Could this be true? What other important
factors must be considered that affect people’s self-restraint behavior? To address these questions,
we analyze people’s self-restraint behavior by introducing stigma into our theoretical model, as well
as the risk of infection.
The research on stigma has developed around social psychology Major et al. (2018), starting
with the discussion by Goffman (1963). There are several studies on stigma in economics as well;
Moffitt (1983); Besley and Coate (1992); Bhargava and Manoli (2015) study the stigma of accepting
welfare benefits (Lindbeck et al., 1999; Kurita et al., 2020; Itaya and Kurita, 2020). Moreover, Kim
(2003) analyzes the stigma related to tax evasion, and Rasmusen (1996) investigates the stigma for
ex-convicts.
Stigma is important in analyzing the going-out behavior during the spread of infectious diseases
since stigma can have a complementary role to infection risk in people’s self-restraint behavior.
In Japan, under the state of emergency, it was a social norm to refrain from going out. Public
opinion was formed such that going out under the state of emergency was considered to be anti-
social behavior. In other words, people who go out under the state of emergency are stigmatized as
having inferior ethics in the society because they do not follow the social norms.
The theoretical analysis in this study assumes that the individual going out suffers psychological
costs arising from both the stigma of going out and the risk of infection under the declared state of
emergency. That is, we emphasize that infection risk and stigma have a complementary effect on
the psychological cost to the player. As a result, the hypothesis is derived that under a declared
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state of emergency, people refrain more from going out as it entails a strong psychological cost.
For the empirical perspectives, several studies analyze the impact of Japan’s non-legally en-
forceable emergency declarations on the population. For example, Kobayashi et al. (2020) use a
state-space model that combines the susceptible-infected-recovered models to predict the evolution
of infectious diseases as well as includes the magnitude and timing of the peak of the epidemic,
following interventions by the emergency declaration in Japan. They confirm that the issuance and
extension of the state of emergency declaration has been successful in controlling the COVID-19
epidemic to some extent. Yamamoto et al. (2020), based on a survey of areas where the spread of
COVID-19 infection was significant, show that actions of self-restraint based on the declaration of
a state of emergency cause psychological distress. Kawaguchi et al. (2020) use data with Japanese
small and medium-sized enterprises to find that, in the short term, the state of emergency reduces
both feasible and expected sales of firms. Qian and Yahara (2020) conduct a survey under the
state of emergency and find that accuracy, morality, and ideology are changing people’s behav-
ior and mental health in response to COVID-19. Finally, Yamamura and Tsutsui (2020) analyze
individual-level changes in preventive behavior and mental status due to the emergency declaration.
In contrast with studies analyzing the impact of non-legally-binding policies such as those de-
scribed above, others analyze the impact of an enforceable lockdown on the economy (Acemoglu
et al., 2020; Alvarez et al., 2020; Farboodi et al., 2020; Holtemo¨ller, 2020; Eichenbaum et al., 2020;
Gharehgozli et al., 2020; Mandel and Veetil, 2020; Martin et al., 2020). Martin et al. (2020) develop
a microeconomic model to assess the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 on individuals, estimating
the direct impact of the lockdown policy on household income, consumption, and poverty. Acemoglu
et al. (2020) build a heterogeneous susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered model and conclude that
a lockdown policy that focuses on at-risk older groups is optimal. Alvarez et al. (2020) discuss the
optimal lockdown policy to minimize the deaths and economic costs attributable to COVID-19,
using the formulation as an optimization problem. Mandel and Veetil (2020) estimate the costs
of a lockdown in some sectors of the global economy due to COVID-19 using a multi-sector dise-
quilibrium model that considers the buyer–seller relationship between agents in different countries.
However, stigma is out of scope for all. In addition, lockdowns, unlike emergency declarations, have
a legal basis with penalties. In other words, they do not consider the effects of looser emergency
declarations that are not legally binding.
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Based on the above research, this study contributes in the following ways: First, it develops a
microeconomic theoretical model of people’s going-out behavior in legally non-binding emergency
declarations while considering the social stigma against going out. Second, we estimate a macro-
panel data model that combines daily data on various outside behaviors covering all prefectures
in Japan that are collected pre declaration, under declaration, and post declaration, as well as
covariates to control for various confounding factors. We thus measure the effect of emergency
declarations on the behavior of people outside the area while considering factors that contribute to
their behavior and the heterogeneity of emergency declarations in different areas with different dates
of issuance. In addition, we compared the behavior of people who went out after the emergency
declaration was lifted with that before the declaration.
The advantage of our contribution over existing studies on non-legally binding emergency dec-
larations is as follows: First, there is little analysis in the literature on going-out actions associated
with the issuance of emergency declarations based on ambiguous legal systems. Second, we build a
theoretical model to explain going-out behavior under non-legally binding emergency declarations
based on social stigma. Although Yamamura and Tsutsui (2020) analyze people’s going-out behav-
ior under a state of emergency in Japan, because their data set is based on an online questionnaire
survey, there is a possibility of measurement error due to personal memory differences and other
factors. Moreover, because their study used a sample composed of two time points—before and
after the declaration of an emergency—they did not consider changes in going-out activity after
lifting of the state of emergency. In contrast, this study conducts an empirical analysis consid-
ering the three time points of pre-declaration, under-declaration, and post-declaration using data
obtained from Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, which provide more objective data
compared with questionnaire survey data.
In the following, we summarize our results. The theoretical analysis showed that the incentive
to go out is reduced under the state of emergency compared with that after it is lifted through the
stigmatization of going-out behavior. In other words, the number of people who go out under the
state of emergency is lower than that after the emergency is lifted. Second, in the empirical analysis,
we examined the going-out behavior under a declared state of emergency using daily mobility data
for 47 prefectures in Japan. After controlling for confounding factors that may vary by prefecture
and time, we find that going-out behavior decreased under- and post-declaration of the state of
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emergency. Furthermore, this study finds that going-out behavior decreased the most during the
under-declaration period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present a theoretical
analysis. Section 3 discusses the data, econometric methods, and analytical results. Finally, this
study concludes in Section 4.
2 Theoretical Model
Consider an economy in which the mass of the population is normalized to 1. The player choose to
go out or not. The player’s payoff is set as follows:


uout − φ [γc+ ισs]
δ if going out,
uhome if staying at home,
(1)
where uout is the utility from going out and uhome is the utility from staying at home. We assume
that the utility from going out is higher than that from staying at home, that is, uout > uhome.
φ [γc+ ισs]δ is the term of the psychological cost. This cost contains two components of the
risk of infection of the virus (γc) and the stigma (ισs). This formulation indicates that the stigma
and risk of infection are complementary in the psychological cost. Here, φ ∈ [0, φ¯] is the sensitivity
to the psychological cost, γ ∈ [0, 1] is the subjective probability of an individual being infected after
going out, c is the cost of infection, s is the stigma cost, σ ∈ (0,+∞) is the parameter that indicates
the size of the stigma cost relative to the cost of infection, δ ∈ (0,+∞) is the parameter of cost to
scale, and ι ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator variable that equals one if a state of emergency is declared and
zero otherwise.
We assume that φ has distribution φ ∼ F (·), where F ′(·) := f(·) and f(φ) > 0 for φ ∈ [0, φ¯].
Then, we consider the critical level of the sensitivity to stigma cost as follows:
uout − φˆ [γc+ ισs]
δ = uhome. (2)
From Equation (2), individuals with sensitivities below (above) this threshold have an incentive to
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go out (stay home). Solving for φˆ, we obtain the following:
φˆ =
∆
[γc+ ισs]δ
, (3)
where ∆ := uout − uhome > 0.
The proportion of individuals who go out, x, is as follows:
x = Pr(φ ≤ φˆ) = F (φˆ). (4)
We suppose that the stigma cost function is based on conformism as in Lindbeck et al. (1999,
2003). We assume that the stigma cost decreases with the proportion of individuals who go out,
that is, s = s(x), s′(x) < 0, and s ∈ (0,+∞).
We also assume that the difference of utility is higher than the expected cost of infection, that
is, ∆ > γc. When ι = 0, all individuals choose going out since uout > uhome. On the other hand,
the case of ι = 1 is analyzed as follows:


φˆ =
∆
[γc+ ισs]δ
,
x = F
(
φˆ
)
,
s = s(x),
(5)
x = F


∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ

 := χ(x). (6)
The fixed point of the mapping from x to x in Equation (6), x∗, is the equilibrium of this model1.
Clearly, there is at least one equilibrium from the intermediate value theorem.
We present the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There can exist multiple equilibria under a state of emergency. On the other hand,
1The stability condition for the equilibrium is ∂χ/∂x < 1.
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there exists a unique equilibrium when the state of emergency is lifted as follows:
x∗post = F


∆
(γc)δ

 (7)
Proof. The slope of mapping (6) is given as follows:
∂χ
∂x
= f


∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ




∆δ [γc+ ισs(x)]δ−1
[γc+ ισs(x)]2δ

 [−ισs′(x)] . (8)
There is the possibility of multiple equilibria under a state of emergency since the sign of Equation
(8) is positive.
On the other hand, the sign of Equation (8) is zero when a state of emergency is lifted. To
confirm the equilibrium when a state of emergency is lifted, by substituting ι = 0 into Equation
(6), we get the following result:
χ(x)|ι=0 = F


∆
(γc)δ

 (9)
Clearly, Equation (9) is fixed with respect to x. Therefore, the equilibrium when a state of emergency
is lifted (x∗post) is unique as follows:
x∗post = F


∆
(γc)δ

 (10)
Proposition 1 suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria displayed in Figure 1 as an example.
This figure shows a mapping from x to x, defined as χ(x): χ(x)|ι=1 or χ(x)|ι=0, where χ(x)|ι=1 is the
mapping under a state of emergency and χ(x)|ι=0 is the mapping after a state of emergency. There
exist two equilibria, one with very few people going-out (x∗under;L) and one with many people going-
out (x∗under;H), as multiple equilibria under the state of emergency in Figure 1. We call x
∗
under;L
the “strictly self-restraint equilibrium” and x∗under;H the “non-strictly self-restraint equilibrium.”
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The reason for this is the existence of a certain complementarity that arises from the presence of
externalities between people’s behavior under the state of emergency. We can consider that in the
Japanese case, under the emergency declaration, an equilibrium with fewer people out and about
was achieved—that is, the strictly self-restraint equilibrium, x∗under;L—and after the emergency
declaration, social norms were no longer in effect—that is, the non-strictly self-restraint equilibrium,
x∗post. On the other hand, the Florida case could be deemed to fall under x
∗
under;H (BBC, 2020;
Bloomberg, 2020). In Florida under the declaration of the state of emergency, we can assume that
an equilibrium was achieved in which many people did not choose to act with restraint.
The following proposition presents the results for the difference in the number of citizens going
out between the under the declaration of the state of emergency and after its lifting.
Proposition 2 The number of players going out under the state of emergency (xunder) is less than
those going out after the state of emergency was lifted (xpost), ceteris paribus.
Proof. Under the state of emergency (ι = 1), by substituting ι = 1 into (6), we get the following:
χ (x) |ι=1 = F


∆
[γc+ σs(x)]δ

 . (11)
We denote a fixed point for mapping (11) as xunder.
After the state of emergency is lifted, by substituting ι = 0 into (6), we get the following:
χ (x) |ι=0 = F


∆
(γc)δ

 . (12)
We denote a fixed point for mapping (12) as xpost.
The difference between Equations (11) and (12) is given as follows:
χ (x) |ι=1 − χ (x) |ι=0 < 0. (13)
Therefore, we get the following result:
x∗under − x
∗
post < 0 (14)
9
for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2 shows that even in the condition with a fixed subjective probability of infection,
the number of people going out under a request for self-restraint based on the declaration of a state
of emergency is lower than those going out after the state of emergency is lifted. This implies that
a non-legally binding policy—the state of emergency—can influence going-out behavior through
stigma regardless of the fear of infection. Figure 1 shows that the mapping under the state of
emergency, χ(x)|ι=1, is never above the mapping of χ(x)|ι=0. That is, we confirm the relationship
of, x∗post > x
∗
under;H > x
∗
under;L.
The following proposition presents this interesting result.
Proposition 3 Under the state of emergency, that is, ι = 1, some players self-restrain from going
out, even if all players expect the probability of infection to be zero, that is, γ = 0.
Proof. By substituting ι = 1 and γ = 0 into Equation (6), we get the following:
χ (x) |ι=1,γ=0 = F


∆
[σs(x)]δ

 . (15)
The sign of Equation (15) is positive since ∆ > 0, σ > 0, and s(x) > 0 for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
the fixed point for mapping (15) is positive, that is, x∗under > 0.
Proposition 3 suggests that some individuals refrain from going out even if all of them thought
the probability of infection was zero under the emergency declaration. This suggests that even in
the absence of fear of infection, non-legally binding emergency declarations can influence behavior
through stigma.
This section describes the theoretical analysis of individual behavior in situations where there
is an infection risk and psychological cost due to stigma. We show that requests for self-restraint
against going out based on non-legally binding emergency declarations are in effect in an equilibrium.
Notably, Proposition 3 suggests that non-legally binding emergency declarations also affect the
behavior of players with through stigma even in the condition with a fixed subjective probability of
infection. In the following empirical analysis, we examine the results of Proposition 22.
2Proposition 3 analyzes going-out behavior under the subjective infection probability of zero. However, since it is
difficult to verify a situation wherein the subjective infection probability is zero in the real world, only Proposition 2
is tested in the empirical analysis.
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3 Empirical Analysis
This section analyzes how Japan’s unenforceable emergency declarations triggered by COVID-19
affected people’s going-out behavior using daily prefectural population flow data from the Google
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports as well as several covariates. In addition, we analyze how
the behavior of people who went out after the state of emergency was lifted changed compared
with that before it was issued, that is, whether the effects of the declaration continued after the
emergency was lifted.
3.1 Methodology
In this study, we analyze the effects of emergency declarations on people’s going-out behavior using
a panel data model. Specifically, the following one-way error component model (Baltagi, 1984) is
used:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit,
eit = αi + νit, (16)
where y is the dependent variable on human flow, i = 1, . . . , n is the index for the ith prefec-
ture, t = 1, . . . , T is the date, x is an explanatory variable vector containing covariates, β is an
unknown parameter vector, and e is the disturbance term. Furthermore, as in Equation 16, the
disturbance term can be decomposed into stochastic variability ν and prefecture-level heterogeneity
α. Furthermore, focusing on the explanatory variable vector, it is decomposed as follows:
xit :=
[
d′it,w
′
it
]′
, (17)
where dit is a vector of target variables consisting of two dummy variables, one for the date under
the declaration and one for the date after the declaration, and wit is a covariate vector.
The model in Equation (16) can be estimated using a one-way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter,
one-way FE) and the one-way random-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way RE). The one-way FE
presumes the binary dummy variable for αi, whereas the one-way RE assumes that the individual
effect is randomly determined. In this study, we estimate both and examine the estimates adopted
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as a result of the Hausman test.
3.2 Data
This study measures the impact of unenforceable emergency declarations on people’s going-out
behavior in Japan. For this purpose, we constructed a daily panel dataset at the prefecture level.
In this section, we describe the contents of the data in detail.
First, we discuss the dependent variable yit described in Section 3.1, namely, going-out behavior,
which is the subject of the effects of policy interventions. This study uses the Google COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports3 to evaluate the impact of the data on people’s going-out behavior
across Japan. Google collected these data to provide one piece of evidence on how public health
authorities respond to COVID-19. These data are anonymized and aggregated with an emphasis
on protecting people’s privacy by using only location information from applications such as Google
Maps4; in other words, the data are summarized by region. In Japan, about 90% of the people
have used map applications at least once, and the number of Google Maps users is about 80%
based on a survey5. Therefore, anonymized aggregate data obtained from users’ Google Maps
location data are considered reliable in terms of representing human flows in all prefectures of
Japan. In addition, these data are divided into six categories according to the content of the
going-out behavior: “Retail & recreation,” “Grocery & pharmacy,” “Parks,” “Transit stations,”
“Workplaces,” and “Residential.” In this study, four of these six categories, “Retail & recreation”
(retail), “Grocery & pharmacy” (grocery), “Parks” (park), and “Workplaces” (workplace), are
used as dependent variables in terms of measuring the effect of emergency declarations based on the
purpose of going out. According to the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, retail
refers to going-out behavior consisting of entertainment and leisure-time purchases at restaurants,
cafes, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, cinemas, and so forth. grocery refers
to going-out behavior for activities related to purchasing daily necessities, such as visiting grocery
stores, food wholesalers, fruit and vegetable markets, luxury grocery stores, drug stores, pharmacies,
and so forth. park refers to an going-out to a park, such as a regional park, national park, public
beach, marina, dog park, square, garden, and so forth. Finally, workplace refers to going-out
3https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/, accessed on July 10, 2020
4https://www.google.co.jp/maps/, accessed on July 10, 2020
5https://www.value-press.com/pressrelease/215276, in Japanese, accessed on July 10, 2020
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behavior related to traveling to the workplace. In addition, it is important to note that these
movement data are presented as percentage changes from the baseline value for each of the seven
days of the week. These baseline values are defined by the median value for each of the seven days
of the week during the five-week period from January 3 to February 6, 2020.
Second, we discuss variables that make up the target explanatory variable, dit. This vector
comprises variables that measure the status of the emergency declaration. Therefore, we use the
following variables as target variables in this study: the first is under that takes 1 on dates under
the state of emergency and 0 otherwise, and the second is post that takes 1 on dates after the
state of emergency lifted and 0 otherwise. The dates on which the state of emergency was declared
and was lifted differ from prefecture to prefecture. In this study, we use date range data on the
emergency declaration in Japan (Katafuchi, 2020) based on reports published by the Office for Novel
Coronavirus Disease Control, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan.
Third, we describe a covariate vector wit. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable in this
dataset is represented by the disparity from the seven reference values on each day of the week.
Therefore, it is possible that there are seasonal differences between the five weeks within which those
reference values are defined and the sample. In this study, two weather variables, daily precipitation
(precipitation) and daily sunshine hours (sunlight), obtained from the Japan Meteorological
Agency6, are used to control for its seasonality. The positional attributes of these data are defined
by a more detailed classification than at the prefecture level. Therefore, in this study, we treat
meteorological data from the prefectural capitals as prefecture-level meteorological data to ensure
representativeness. Furthermore, we consider that the impact of the spread of COVID-19, that is,
the subjective probability of contracting the disease, on people’s going-out behavior is present, as
also incorporated in the theoretical model in Section 2. Therefore, it is necessary to control the
situation of infection at the prefecture level. This study thus incorporates a one-period lag of the
increase in the number of infected people per million (inc positive perm) into the covariate vector.
These data are calculated using the data from TOYO KEIZAI ONLINE (2020). However, since the
data period begins from March 11, 2020, the data before that date were compiled based on press
releases by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan 7.
6https://www.data.jma.go.jp/obd/stats/etrn/index.php, in Japanese, accessed on July 10, 2020
7https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000121431_00086.html, in Japanese, accessed on July
10, 2020
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Finally, we discuss how to determine the sample period for this dataset. Table 1 shows when the
state of emergency was declared (emergency start) and lifted (emergency end) for each prefecture,
as well as the period during which the state of emergency was declared (emergency length). The
length of time under the emergency declaration varied from prefecture to prefecture—the shortest
period was 28 days in about 80% of the prefectures. In this study, we use the mode value of the
period under the emergency declaration to determine the length of the sample period under the
state of emergency and after its lifting. Accordingly, this length is determined from the issuance
to the cancellation of the state of emergency in large urban areas, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, and
Osaka, as these areas had longer emergency periods than most other regions. Therefore, we define
the sample period from April 7 to 28 days prior to the declaration of the state of emergency in
these metropolitan areas—that is, March 10, 2020, is the starting point of the entire sample period.
On the other hand, this study defines the sample period from May 25 to 28 days after the lifting
of the state of emergency for these metropolitan areas as the post-declaration sample period, with
June 22, 2020 as the endpoint of the overall sample period. The sample is therefore composed of 47
prefectures, that is, n = 47; the sample period is from March 10 to June 22, 2020, that is, T = 105;
and the sample size is N = nT = 47× 105 = 4, 935.
3.3 Result
First, we briefly look at the disparity between the going-out behavior in the pre-declaration, under-
declaration, and post-declaration periods. It must be noted that each of these disparities is defined
by the difference from representative value for the reference period defined by the Google COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports. Figure 2 shows the disparity for retail, that is, the difference from
the reference value for the going-out purpose of purchasing activities related to entertainment and
leisure, for the time period specified by the declaration of the state of emergency. To show the
disparity more clearly by day of the week in this figure, we choose representative dates for each day
of the week for each time period defined by the emergency declaration, so that the status of the
emergency declaration is the same for all prefectures: March 28 (Saturday), March 29 (Sunday),
and April 1 (Wednesday) for pre-declaration; April 25 (Saturday), April 26 (Sunday), and April
29 (Wednesday) for under-declaration; and May 30 (Saturday), May 31 (Sunday), and June 3
(Wednesday) for post-declaration. To further reflect the status of infection in each prefecture,
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this figure groups the samples by the date of the end of the state of emergency and shows the
different shapes of the points. The three panels on the left compare the going-out behavior for
retail between flows under and before the emergency declaration, and the three panels on the
right compare the flows for retail under and after the emergency was lifted. The overall trend
is that there is more flow of people pre- and post-declaration of a state of emergency compared
with under-declaration. In other words, the flow of people for retail under a declared state of
emergency is decreasing. This is because almost all of the points are to the left of the 45 degree
line. However, a comparison between Sundays before and under the emergency declaration shows
a slight increase in flows under the emergency declaration in some large cities such as Tokyo and
Kanagawa in prefectures where the declaration was lifted the latest.
Next, we look briefly at the disparity in human flows for grocery. Figure 3 shows the same
overall trend as for retail, although the number of prefectures where the flow of people is higher
in the under-declaration than in the pre-declaration is higher here. As for parks, except for the
Saturday after lifting the state of emergency and the Sunday before its lifting, the overall increase
in the number of people going to parks under the emergency declaration can be seen in Figure 4.
Finally, for workplace, the trend is the same as for retail and grocery. Figure 5 shows that the
number of people going out for work decreased on any day of the week under a declared emergency
situation. This can be attributed to the people’s semi-compulsory decision of not going out for work
in response to the government’s telecommute requirements. With the exception of the going out
for park, the going-out behavior in all categories decreased under the declared emergency situation.
However, an analysis controlling for seasonality is necessary for park; furthermore, this analysis
fails to account for prefecture-level heterogeneity in going-out behavior. In this study, we estimate
the panel data model described in Section 3.1 and conduct in-depth analysis of how non-legally
binding emergency declarations can affect going-out behavior.
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the panel data model introduced in Section 3.1 with
the prefecture-level panel dataset created by this study. Each column represents a category of
the dependent variable, the change in going-out behavior from the reference period of going out.
Following the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the Hausman test are less than
5% statistically significant, a one-way fixed effect estimator is used in all categories except for park.
This may be explained by the fact that heterogeneity at the prefectural level is randomly determined
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with respect to the going-out behavior for park, as seen in the scatter-plot analysis described above.
The estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all dependent variables, both
under and post. Therefore, the results show that, comparing the periods before the emergency
declaration and the reference value, going-out behavior decreased in both the under-declaration
and post-declaration. Furthermore, looking at the estimated magnitudes of the coefficients, under
is smaller than post for all dependent variables. This phenomenon suggests that under the state of
emergency declaration, people may have been less likely to go out than post-declaration, based on
the difference between their behaviors and the reference value before the emergency declaration.
To confirm the robustness of this relationship, this study conducts sensitivity analyses. First,
results of the estimation with all covariates excluded are shown in Table 3. In this simpler estimation
model, a one-way random effect estimator is used in the models for the three dependent variables
except for workplace, following the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the
Hausman test show that a statistical significance is less than 5%. Therefore, it is desirable that
heterogeneity at the prefectural level is randomly determined when no covariates are incorporated
into the model. The estimation results, however, show the same tendency as in Table 2, which
presents the estimation result with all covariates. Second, the results of the estimation using
estimators, which are not adopted based on the rule of using a fixed-effect estimator if the results
of the Hausman test showed less than 5% statistical significance, are shown in Table 4 when all
covariates are included and in Table 5 when all covariates are excluded. In these results, the
coefficients are similar to those in Tables 2 and 3, that is, fewer going-out individuals at under
and post declaration compared with the pre-declaration of the state of emergency. Moreover, the
most self-restraint was shown under the declaration of the state of emergency. Third, Tables 6
and 7 show the results of each estimation in a sample of 47 prefectures divided into two subsets:
one (N = nT = 7 × 105 = 735) consisting of the seven prefectures where a state of emergency
was declared the earliest on April 7, 2020 (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Hyogo, and
Fukuoka), as shown in Table 1, and the other (N = nT = 40 × 105 = 4, 200) consisting of the
remaining 40 prefectures where the state of emergency was not issued on this date. The estimators
used are based on the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the Hausman test
show that a statistical significance is less than 5%. These results reinforce the findings that for
both the seven prefectures with the earliest emergency declaration and the other 40 prefectures,
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there was less going-out behavior under and post declaration compared with before the declaration.
Moreover, the most significant self-restraint behavior was observed under the declaration, except
for the estimated result for the seven prefectures that there was less going-out behavior for park
after the emergency was lifted than under the declaration. These sensitivity analyses indicate that
the phenomenon of a statistically significant negative coefficient for under and post and a smaller
coefficient for under than for post is robust.
This section confirmed the following: Going-out behavior was reduced both under the emergency
declaration and after the emergency was lifted compared with the pre-declaration of the state of
emergency; in addition, going-out behavior was most suppressed under the emergency declaration.
This result clarifies two findings: First, people refrained from going out both under the declaration
and after the lifting of the state of emergency. Second, despite the non-legally binding emergency
declarations, people were more likely to refrain from going out under the declaration of a state
of emergency than after it was lifted. Therefore, this second finding in the empirical analysis is
consistent with Proposition 2 of the theoretical analysis in Section 2. This suggests that under a
declared state of emergency, people may have acted because of the stigma of going-out as well as
the risk of infection.
4 Conclusion
This study analyzes the effects of non-legally binding policies on curfews from two perspectives:
the construction of a micro-theoretical model and an empirical analysis using panel data from the
Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports.
A plausible reason for the declaration to be effective is that people considered the risk of infection
to be high. If this were the only reason, then the effect of restraint should be consistent when the risk
of infection is constant under the declaration of an emergency and after it is lifted. The theoretical
analysis of this study assumes that under a declared state of emergency, the going-out individual
suffers psychological costs arising from both the risk of infection and the stigma of going-out. As a
result, a hypothesis is derived that under a declared state of emergency, going out entails a strong
psychological cost and people refrain more from going out (Proposition 2).
The empirical analysis, using a panel dataset consisting of date data on the Japanese emer-
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gency declaration and daily human flow data as well as various covariates from Google COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports, revealed the following two points. First, the flow of people under
the declaration of a state of emergency was suppressed. Second, although the effect of the restraint
continued after the state of emergency was lifted, the degree of restraint was greater under the
declaration of the state of emergency.
As the number of infected people in Japan is increasing again, there is a possibility that another
state of emergency will be declared. In terms of policy action in such circumstances, the results of
this study provide one policy implication by highlighting that non-legally binding policies can be
effective in terms of reducing the number of people infected, that is, by curtailing their going-out
behavior.
The theoretical analysis in this study suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria—strictly
self-restraint equilibrium and not-strictly self-restraint equilibrium. In both equilibria, declaring a
state of emergency has the effect of reducing the number of people going out, but the degree of effect
may vary significantly. If multiple equilibria exist, while the strictly self-restraint equilibrium was
realized in Japan in reality, the not-strictly self-restraint equilibrium could also have been realized.
Finally, there is no guarantee that the effect of the emergency declaration will always be the
same. In the theoretical model of this study, the first and subsequent declarations of states of
emergency had the same effect. On the other hand, from a social psychological point of view, the
effect may be weakened as people become accustomed a declared state of emergency. Therefore, it
is likely that the method and content of announcements would need to be revised as they are made
more often.
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Figure 2: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: retail
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for retail between
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 3: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: grocery
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for grocery between
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 4: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: park
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for park between the
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 5: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: workplace
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for workplace between the
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration (right) for
three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Table 1: Date and length of state of emergency in the prefectures of Japan
prefecture emergency start emergency end emergency length
Hokkaido 2020-04-16 2020-05-25 39
Aomori 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Iwate 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Miyagi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Akita 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamagata 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukushima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ibaraki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tochigi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Gunma 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Saitama 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Chiba 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Tokyo 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Kanagawa 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Niigata 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Toyama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ishikawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukui 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamanashi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Nagano 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Gifu 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shizuoka 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Aichi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Mie 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shiga 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kyoto 2020-04-16 2020-05-21 35
Osaka 2020-04-07 2020-05-21 44
Hyogo 2020-04-07 2020-05-21 44
Nara 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Wakayama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tottori 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shimane 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Okayama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Hiroshima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamaguchi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tokushima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kagawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ehime 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kochi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukuoka 2020-04-07 2020-05-14 37
Saga 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Nagasaki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kumamoto 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Oita 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Miyazaki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kagoshima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Okinawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
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Table 2: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data
Dependent variable
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.955∗∗∗ −5.578∗∗∗ −12.884∗∗∗ −18.182∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.235) (1.544) (0.507)
post −6.410∗∗∗ −2.159∗∗∗ −7.231∗∗∗ −3.340∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.199) (1.770) (0.325)
Constant −6.067∗∗∗
(1.296)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.588 0.488 0.533 0.335
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.483 0.532 0.328
Hausman-test 1513.3∗∗∗ 73.443∗∗∗ 3.393 114.81∗∗∗
Estimator FE FE RE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
Table 3: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis without covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −20.143∗∗∗ −5.288∗∗∗ −10.972∗∗∗ −18.142∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.245) (1.460) (0.526)
post −5.925∗∗∗ −2.600∗∗∗ −9.664∗∗∗ −3.368∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.215) (2.071) (0.311)
Constant −7.482∗∗∗ 3.005∗∗∗ 8.421∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.240) (1.231)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.492 0.177 0.045 0.334
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.177 0.045 0.327
Hausman-test 4.586 0.093 0.045 21.868∗∗∗
Estimator RE RE RE FE
Covariates No No No No
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
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Table 4: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using other estimators
with covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.991∗∗∗ −5.577∗∗∗ −12.891∗∗∗ −18.305∗∗∗
(0.519) (0.236) (1.545) (0.525)
post −6.446∗∗∗ −2.162∗∗∗ −7.232∗∗∗ −3.452∗∗∗
(0.392) (0.199) (1.773) (0.347)
Constant −8.138∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗ −7.925∗∗∗
(0.545) (0.281) (0.354)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.585 0.486 0.536 0.336
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.485 0.531 0.335
Hausman-test 1513.3∗∗∗ 73.443∗∗∗ 3.393 114.81∗∗∗
Estimator RE RE FE RE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
Table 5: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using other estimators
without covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −20.101∗∗∗ −5.286∗∗∗ −10.977∗∗∗ −18.272∗∗∗
(0.630) (0.245) (1.464) (0.555)
post −5.926∗∗∗ −2.600∗∗∗ −9.665∗∗∗ −3.364∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.215) (2.070) (0.310)
Constant −7.572∗∗∗
(0.300)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.495 0.178 0.046 0.334
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.170 0.036 0.333
Hausman-test 4.586 0.093 0.045 21.868∗∗∗
Estimator FE FE FE RE
Covariates No No No No
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
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Table 6: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using a subset of the
sample with the earliest state of emergency declaration
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −25.005∗∗∗ −6.341∗∗∗ −9.888∗∗∗ −23.756∗∗∗
(1.312) (0.588) (1.016) (0.729)
post −10.002∗∗∗ −2.826∗∗∗ −11.053∗∗∗ −7.739∗∗∗
(1.051) (0.590) (0.830) (0.846)
Constant −12.034∗∗∗
(2.199)
Observations 735 735 735 735
R2 0.734 0.627 0.669 0.485
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.621 0.664 0.477
Hausman-test 11.020∗ 34.235∗∗∗ 467.020∗∗∗ 1083.000∗∗∗
Estimator RE FE FE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
Table 7: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using a subset of the
sample without the earliest state of emergency declaration
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.195∗∗∗ −5.480∗∗∗ −13.666∗∗∗ −17.247∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.263) (1.798) (0.429)
post −5.982∗∗∗ −2.124∗∗∗ −6.863∗∗∗ −2.715∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.213) (2.037) (0.232)
Constant −7.342∗∗∗ −6.383∗∗∗
(0.419) (1.404)
Observations 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200
R2 0.552 0.487 0.513 0.308
Adjusted R2 0.552 0.481 0.513 0.301
Hausman-test 4.315∗ 29.896∗∗∗ 0.2385 17.459∗∗∗
Estimator RE FE RE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect; RE=random
effect.
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